This paper constructs regime-switching models for estimating the probability of inflation returning to its relatively high levels of variability and persistence in the 1970s and 1980s. Forecasts and probabilities of extreme events from the models are evaluated against comparable estimates from other statistical models, from surveys, and from financial markets. The paper then uses the models to construct prediction intervals around Federal Reserve Board staff forecasts of PCE price inflation, combining the recent non-parametric forecast error distribution with parametric information from the model. The outer tails of the prediction intervals depend importantly on the probability inflation is in its high-variance, high-persistence regime.
Introduction
The decline in inflation variability and persistence in recent decades-see Stock and Watson (2007) -has important implications for constructing measures of forecast uncertainty.
Taking on board that decline in variability and persistence is reasonable when estimating uncertainty around forecasts that are conditioned on such an environment continuing over the forecast horizon. That might be the case for the forecasts that members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) submit in advance of their meetings once per quarter, since those forecasts are conditioned on "appropriate monetary policy".
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However, constructing measures of unconditional forecast uncertainty requires estimates of the probability that the conditioning assumptions break down over the forecast horizon, and the distribution from which the data would be generated if the conditioning assumptions do break down. This paper constructs models that provide such estimates, Markovswitching models where inflation switches from a low-variance regime with a stable mean to a high-variance, random-walk regime. Probabilities from the model show the second regime governed the behavior of inflation from the late 1960s to the early 1990s, while the first regime has governed the behavior of inflation from the early 1990s to the end of the sample used in the paper.
The small number of regime transitions in the sample poses some challenges, discussed at length in the paper. Model fit is evaluated by comparing forecasts and probabilities of extreme events from the models with an array of comparable estimates, from other statistical models to surveys to financial markets. For example, the recent low-variance, low-persistence inflation regime is often associated with the relative stability of survey measures of long-run inflation expectations (see Bernanke (2010) ), so the paper compares those survey measures with long-run inflation forecasts from the Markov-switching model. In the 1990s, the model recognized the inflation regime transition and its implications for long-run forecasting years ahead of the surveys, suggesting that proper use of the model may provide inferences about the inflation regime that are more timely and accurate than those based on surveys. It goes without saying that accurate inferences about the inflation regime are critically important for the conduct of monetary policy.
Overall, model fit seems adequate to proceed with construction of prediction intervals estimating the uncertainty around Federal Reserve Board staff forecasts of PCE price inflation. In this case, the usable history of staff forecasts does not extend back far enough to include any observations from the period of high inflation variability and persistence, so estimation of a model is necessary to account for uncertainty arising from a possible reversion to that type of behavior. However, even if a longer sample including such observations were available, the standard approach to computing prediction intervals, which gives equal weight to each observation in the sample, is inadequate when there is predictable variation in the regime probability.
2 Such an approach abdicates responsibility for estimating what could be the most important unobserved variable in the process, the regime probability.
While various time-varying parameter models have been used to analyze the inflation process, the Markov-switching approach here is appealing because forecast error distributions computed non-parametrically can be combined easily in a mixture with model-based forecast error distributions that are, out of necessity, parametric. For the low-variance regime with a stable mean, the paper recommends the non-parametric approach, where forecast error percentiles are estimated directly from the percentiles of the sorted sample of available forecast error observations. Such an approach allows asymmetries and other non-standard features of the sample show through to prediction intervals, and the sample of Board staff forecast errors does show marked asymmetries. In particular, the forecasts at one end of the forecast error distribution-those that were too low-missed by much more than the forecasts at the other end of the distribution that were too high. The paper discusses possible reasons for this asymmetry.
The unconditional forecast error distribution is a mixture distribution, a linear combination of the non-parametric distribution in the low-variance regime and a parametric distribution in the high-variance regime, using the estimated regime probabilities as the weights on these two distributions-see Hamilton (1989) . Prediction intervals computed from this mixture do not assume that inflation remains in the low-variance regime with certainty over the forecast horizon, but when the probability of the low-variance regime is very high as in recent years, the prediction intervals around one-and two-year ahead forecasts are well approximated by those computed from the low-variance regime distribution. A sizable increase in the probability of the high-variance regime would change that, increasing the mass in the tails of the distribution noticeably. Since the process in the high-variance regime contains a unit root, the width of prediction intervals would then widen more with the forecast horizon, and the location of the intervals would depends more on the current level of inflation.
Several papers estimate regime-switching models of the inflation process, such as Kim (1993), Evans and Wachtel (1993) , Lanne (2006) , and Davig and Doh (2014) . Those papers also find time-varying persistence and uncertainty in the quarterly or monthly inflation process. This paper uses annual observations, matching the frequency of the forecasts sub-3 mitted by FOMC members ahead of each meeting. Annual observations also have the benefit of averaging away some of the higher-frequency noise in the inflation process, focusing on fluctuations that are more economically interesting. The closest antecedent to this paper is Evans and Wachtel (1993) , who showed that regime uncertainty is an important part of overall inflation uncertainty, a result mirrored here.
Data and Preliminary Analysis
The paper studies fourth-quarter over fourth-quarter (Q4/Q4) growth rates of the consumer price index (CPI) and the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index from 1947-2014, the longest sample available. The two inflation measures are plotted in Figure 1 . The formal inflation target adopted by the FOMC in early 2012 is stated in terms of PCE price inflation, and the aforementioned forecasts of FOMC members target Q4/Q4 PCE price inflation. CPI inflation has been more widely followed traditionally, and is used in pricing inflation-indexed government bonds and other financial instruments-see section 4.2.
Most recent academic research on inflation, exemplified by Stock and Watson (2007) and Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010) Conversely, positive innovations to inflation in 1973-1974, 1979-1980, and 2007 reversed after the economy fell into recession. While most of these reversals are tied to expansion-recession dynamics, not all of them are: negative innovations to inflation in 1986 and 1997-1998, in part due to oil price declines, reversed in 1987-1988 and in 1999-2000. A number of factors likely contributed to the reversals in these innovations since 1973, which were all tied to substantial swings in oil and other commodity prices. First, marketspecific demand and supply responses to the commodity price shocks may have contributed to the reversals, with consumer and producer responses likely becoming more elastic as time passes after the shock and scope for adjustments increases. Second, for the oil price shocks in particular since the U.S. is a net importer of oil, aggregate economic activity ultimately moves in the opposite direction of the price innovation, driven by the effect of the price change on consumption through household purchasing power and consumer confidence.
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These movements in aggregate economic activity are sometimes reinforced by monetary policy reactions to inflation, as in the mid-1970s and early 1980s. However, these forces take time to work through to economic activity, which in turn takes time to feed back through to inflation and reverse part of the initial innovation. 5 Based on the large negative θ 2 , it appears that these processes tend to occur over a two-year period, on average, over the full sample.
The time variation in the inflation process is illustrated by the second panel of Table   1 , which shows MA(2) estimates over the last 20 years of the sample. The innovation variances are much smaller over this subsample and θ 1 ≈ −0.8, so inflation innovations have tended to mostly reverse after a year. Indeed, each θ 1 + θ 2 is close to minus one, consistent with stationarity. Table 2 shows AR(1) estimates on the level of inflation over the same subsample, and while standard errors are large, the estimates are consistent with little to no serial correlation in the inflation process over the last two decades. These in-sample time series specifications are the first category of evidence that motivates the decision in the next section to model the inflation process as switching between stationary and non-stationary regimes.
The second category of evidence suggesting the inflation process has been stationary recently is based on out-of-sample forecast errors. Although one-year ahead inflation appears somewhat predictable with the one-year ahead RMSE less than the two-year ahead RMSE, this likely stems from 5 These inflation reversals working through economic activity could occur in the oil and commodity prices themselves, but also through other prices in the consumption bundle.
6 For example, assume for the moment that inflation could be decomposed into a permanent component 6 a number of factors unrelated to whether there is a random walk component to inflation, including the mechanical effect of known monthly growth rates in the second half of year T entering directly into the year T + 1 annual average growth rate calculation. The test of the existence of a random walk component is whether the RMSEs continue to increase with the forecast horizon, which they do not as the horizon lengthens from two to four years ahead.
These RMSEs are consistent with a stationary inflation process over this time period.
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The third category of evidence favoring stationarity in the U.S. inflation process in recent years is the extensive cross-country historical analysis in Benati (2008) relating the persistence of inflation to the monetary policy regime. That paper finds that inflation-targeting regimes tend to be associated with zero serial correlation in the inflation process, and since the U.S. has adopted such an inflation-targeting regime formally in early 2012 and gradually in a number of steps before then, this evidence supports not only stationarity but also zero serial correlation over the most recent part of the sample. Furthermore, assuming this inflation-targeting regime persists, as currently appears likely, allowing for a stationary regime in a time-varying parameter model of inflation seems likely to become all the more important going forward.
Given all these empirical results over the last 20 years favoring stationarity, it is a bit and a transitory component, as in Stock and Watson (2007) excluding parameter variation for simplicity, so:
Then the variance of the forecast error var(π t+k − E(π t+k |π t )) = σ years is its polar opposite, a model where inflation has zero rather than full persistence.
Model Estimation and Results

Estimation and Current-Period Probabilities
Inflation follows a two regime or two state (S t = 1 or S t = 2) Markov-switching process where:
Let H t−1 = {1, π t−1 , π t−2 , . . . , π 1 , ε 0 = 0, ε −1 = 0} denote the history of the inflation, and:
prob (S t−1 = 1 | H t−1 ) = p t−1|t−1 , and:
The probabilities and likelihood function, a weighted average of the state-contingent likelihood functions with these probabilities as weights, is computed as in Kim (1994) , with the probability of each state persisting from one year to the next governed by the transition matrix:
The initial probability is treated as an estimated parameter.
Results from estimating the model on each of the two inflation measures from are reported in µ S1 is determined by mean inflation from the mid-1950s to mid-1960s and from 1991 to present, and the estimate for PCE price inflation is close to the current FOMC target of 2 percent.
Of course, the two-sided probabilities have the benefit of hindsight; the one-sided probabilities of inflation being in the high-variance, high-persistence state were low in 1967, and it took the elevated inflation readings of 1968 and 1969 to move them up close to 100 percent.
Similarly, the one-sided probabilities of inflation being in the high-variance, high-persistence state remained above 50 percent until 1993 and did not drop below 10 percent until 1995 for PCE price inflation and 1996 for CPI inflation. Since 1997, the one-sided probabilities of inflation being in the high-variance, high-persistence state have been between 2 and 6 percent in all years except 2005 and 2007, when elevated inflation readings produced probabilities of 10 and 12 percent, respectively. In 2014, the last year in the sample, the one-sided probabilities are 5 percent estimated with the CPI and 3 percent estimated with the PCE price index.
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Starting from such low single digit probabilities of inflation being in the high-variance, high-persistence state, it is inflation readings outside of a two standard deviation range around µ S1 that move the probabilities up above those levels. For CPI inflation, that twostandard deviation range is between 0.5 and 4.0 percent, and for PCE price inflation, it is between 0.4 and 3.3 percent. However, if inflation readings outside of these ranges do not persist for more than one period, the model does not infer a high probability of inflation being in the high-variance, high-persistence state, since such a state has itself shown considerable persistence when it has appeared in the past. For example, even if Q4/Q4 PCE price inflation posts a reading of 0.0 percent in 2015, possible given the negative inflation readings early in the year due to steep oil price declines, any PCE price inflation reading between 1.3 and 2.7 percent in 2016 would produce a probability of inflation being in the high-variance, high-persistence state of below 10 percent. Also, these ranges are not immutable, since the sample used to compute the state-contingent means and variances underlying them is not yet very large. Indeed, if two inflation readings such as those considered above did occur, the estimated standard deviation of PCE price inflation in the low-variance state would increase, widening the range.
Caveats to Model Probabilities
It is important to note that since the model has been constructed symmetrically, an inflation reading a certain distance below the mean µ S1 produces a similar probability change as an inflation reading a certain distance above µ S1 , even though the sample contains no cases where low inflation readings produced a transiton to the high-variance, high-persistence state.
This imposition of symmetry was informed by the out-of-sample experience of the Great Depression, which produced four consecutive years of sizable negative inflation rates as the economy contracted sharply, a period that clearly warrants classification in the high-variance, high-persistence state. 8 Nevertheless, it is reasonable to be more skeptical of sizable increases in the probability of the high-variance, high-persistence state when they are generated by low inflation readings instead of high inflation readings.
In particular, it is not clear whether it is possible for low inflation readings to produce a transiton to the high-variance, high-persistence state outside of an economic contraction approaching the severity of the Great Depression, since such a transition has not occured in the U.S. data. A severe recession may very well be a prerequisite for precipitating such a transition. If that is the case, and if the Federal Reserve's nominal interest rate policy is an important determinant of whether or not the economy enters a severe recession, the notion that low inflation in an expansion can produce a transition into the high-variance, high-persistence state is not particularly plausible, since the Federal Reserve's dual mandate makes it is unlikely they would tighten policy enough to generate a severe recession while inflation is low.
Some economic theories posit that declines in inflation that reduce inflation expectations cause households to delay durable goods purchases, with the expected inflation component of the real interest rate reducing consumer demand, possibly generating economic weakness and driving inflation down further. Such a mechanism may well be operable in environments of extreme deflation like the Great Depression. However, more recent empirical evidence from less extreme environments shows the behavior of U.S. consumers is not consistent with that theory; if anything, that evidence is consistent with declining inflation expectations increasing willingness to spend on durable goods-see Bachmann, Berg, and Sims (2015) . Certainly, this mechanism of lower expected inflation reducing spending by raising real interest rates does not appear operable in economic expansions on anywhere close to the scale that would be required to drive inflation into its high-variance, high-persistence state. Furthermore, mechanisms like downward nominal wage rigidity, which could feed through to downward rigidities in price inflation-see Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996)-might make it unlikely that inflation could follow a random walk below certain levels, as would have to be the case after a transition to the high-variance, high-persistence state.
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At a minimum, the nature of the shocks producing low inflation warrants careful examination in evaluating model probabilities. Low inflation readings generated by positive developments in commodity supply, as was the case in late 2014 and early 2015 as advances in tight oil extraction technologies led to sizable increases in U.S. oil production and plunging oil prices, seem particularly unlikely to generate a transition to the high-variance, highpersistence state. As mentioned earlier in the discussion of the MA(2) dynamics of inflation, low inflation readings of this type ultimately prove favorable for economic activity and tend to produce inflation reversals later on. As such, large changes in model probabilities stemming from supply-induced spells of low inflation in economic expansions should be heavily discounted, not taken seriously. Less likely to represent unrealistic, phantom threats to the to respond to nominal rather than real interest rates. Shafir, Diamond, and Tversky (1997) report results from a wide range of surveys suggestive of money illusion. Their results show a strong negative correlation between willingness to spend on durables and inflation over the past year, and while they suggest that this result supports the notion that higher expected inflation increases spending, the opposite is more likely the case because expected inflation is positively correlated with inflation over the past year. For example, from 1979-2014, the SPF 10-year expected inflation measure discussed in the next section has a correlation of 0.86 with Q4/Q4 CPI inflation in the year of the survey. The older results in Juster and Wachtel (1972) also generally support a negative effect of expected inflation on durable goods spending.
stability of the inflation process are large probability changes stemming from low inflation in severe recessions or high inflation stemming from tightening resource utilization in economic expansions.
Transition Probabilities over Longer Horizons
A key result from the models, especially for the computation of prediction intervals, is the estimated probabilities of a regime transition over various time horizons. Probabilities of regime persistence are generally quite high, since the estimation sample of 67 periods contains only one transition out of the low-variance, low-persistence state (in 1967) and two transitions out of the high-variance, high-persistence state (in the 1950s and in 1991).
Conditional on starting in the low-variance regime, the probability of being in the high variance regime k years later is a simple function of the Markov transition matrix raised to the power of k; Table 5 reports these probabilities using PCE price inflation for k ranging from 1 to 10 (as well as the very long run, k=100). After starting in the low-variance regime, the probability of inflation being in the high-variance regime is about 6 percent after two years, 13 percent after five years, and 21 percent after ten years. The probability of inflation being in the high-variance regime asymptotes to 32 percent, its unconditional probability.
These transition probabilities based on historical frequencies are important for determining the properties of inflation over the long run, so the paper evaluates their plausibility in several ways. Most of these evaluations are in the next section, but walk, so the probability that it reaches its average level in the high-variance, high-persistence state gradually increases with the time horizon. 11 These probabilities are somewhat larger than the probabilities of transitioning to the high-variance, high-persistence state from the Markov-switching model, whose properties may be closer to other models that have been developed recently that reduce the dominance of the unit root in the UCSV model in the long run-see Chan, Koop, and Potter (2012) . However, for small k values, the differences between the USCV and Markov-switching models are not particularly large.
Further Model Evaluation
This section evaluates model fit along a number of different dimensions, comparing modelbased forecasts and distributions with analogous results from surveys and financial markets.
In the model:
Hereε t|t = E (ε t |H t ). In any period t + k where S t+k = 1 the forecast is µ S1 , as it is all subsequent periods t + k + j even if S t+k+j = 2 since subsequent state 2 shocks are mean zero. The overall forecast is then the probability-weighted average of these different state dependent forecasts, where the probability weights are computed by iterating p t|t forward in
11 See the footnotes of the table for a description of the calculations in more detail. 
Comparison with Alternative Long-Run Tail Probabilities
While the SPF survey measure above does not provide explicit assessments of the probability distribution of inflation outcomes, other sources have become available more recently that do provide such assessments. First, an options market pricing inflation caps and floors using CPI inflation realizations has developed since 2009, and data on these options prices have been provided to researchers at the Federal Reserve Board by the company BGC partners. Kitsul and Wright (2013) discuss how to use this data to estimate cumulative density functions (cdfs) of average inflation over the next five and next ten years. Board staff constructs cdfs using similar techniques daily; this paper reports annual averages of those daily probabilities for comparison with the Markov-switching models. The options-implied cutoffs round to values of 0.5 since they are derived from an estimated discrete distribution where the probability mass around any integer k can be thought of as covering an area extending from k plus or minus 0.5. Second, since 2010, the Primary Dealer Survey conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York has asked respondents to estimate probabilities of CPI inflation averaging above or below certain levels in the five year period starting five years hence. The lowest and highest cutoffs for average inflation reported in this survey are one and three percent. Table 6 compares the 2014 annual average probabilities from these two sources with analogous probabilities from the Markov-switching model estimated using CPI inflation.
In the model, inflation in each period is normally distributed with means and variances dependent on the state, and with k forecast periods to consider, there are 2 k+2 combinations of state-dependent cdfs.
13 Using probability weights computed as before by iterating forward the 2014 value of p t|t , these state-dependent cdfs are then combined in a weighted average to form the overall cdf. Since the state-dependent cdfs are normal, they can be computed using closed form solutions or approximated via simulations using a large number of draws.
The paper takes the second approach here, and even with k = 10, the simulations are not particularly computationally intensive. The simulated frequencies of average inflation above or below the cutoffs over five or ten year periods are reported in the table. 
One-Year and Two-Year Ahead Forecast Comparisons
Traditional one-year ahead forecast evaluation is not particularly relevant for the prediction intervals studied in the next section, which substitute a non-parametic distribution derived from actual Board staff forecast errors for the model-estimated distribution in the lowvariance, low-persistence state. Nevertheless, comparison of one-and two-year ahead forecast errors from the model with those from alternative sources is informative. The number of observations comprising the discrete distribution from which these percentiles are computed is small, so these percentiles linearly interpolate between observations when the relevant percentile does not fall exactly on an observation percentile in the discrete distribution. Procedures that do not interpolate, instead bootstrapping draws from the distribution of errors, produce similar percentiles to those reported here.
16 While the midpoints of these central tendencies are not perfect substitutes for the Board staff forecasts, the FOMC participants do all have access to the staff's Greenbook in real time. Examination of FOMC transcripts from 2007 to 2009 suggests a number of FOMC participants set their forecasts in close alignment with the Greenbook, although others emphasize the differences between their forecasts and the Greenbook. Those differences might define the edges of the central tendency reported in many SEP rounds.
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2014, these forecasts are close to a constant equal to µ S1 .
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The sample in Figures 6 and 7 permits computation of one-and two-year ahead forecast errors from 1999 to 2015, and inset boxes in each figure report forecast error statistics over this period. Faust and Wright (2012) argue that a good benchmark model for forecasting inflation is one where inflation adjusts smoothly from its current level to the SPF long-run expectation, and since µ S1 is not far from that expectation, the Markov-switching model forecasts are close to that type of benchmark model. However, the one-year ahead forecasts from the Markov-switching model assume rapid adjustment to the long-run expectation;
to examine a forecasting model assuming much slower adjustment, the inset boxes report forecast error statistics for pure random walk forecasts as well.
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The results in Figures 6 and 7 mirror those discussed earlier. First, the Markov-switching model forecasts have lower RMSE than the random walk forecasts, not surprising given the lack of inflation persistence over this period. Second, the Markov-switching model forecasts also have lower RMSE than the Board staff forecasts, and the visually-evident negative correlation between the Board staff forecasts and actual inflation in Figure 7 shows why the near-constant Markov-switching model forecasts outperform. Third, the distribution of Board staff forecast errors is again one-sided, more so than the distributions from the models.
One out of every six or seven Board staff forecasts was far too low over this sample, by at least 1.5 percentage points, but on the other end of the distribution, the forecasts on the high side missed by only one third to one half as much. However, it is interesting to note that the two-year ahead SEP forecasts have been similar to the Markov-switching model forecasts since 2011, as shown in Figure 7 .
Prediction Intervals
Parametric versus Non-parametric: Considerations
While the Markov-switching model forecasts perform better than the Board staff forecasts over the past decade and a half, the Board staff and forecasts employ much more information.
One example is the last one-year ahead SEP forecast from December 2014 that predicted relatively low inflation in 2015, shown in Figure 6 . Oil prices had plunged in late 2014, and it was predictable that this would translate into a plunge in energy prices early in 2015 that likely would hold down PCE price inflation for the year as a whole. Such predictability can arise from a variety of factors that are difficult to capture in a parsimonious time series model. Forecasters in the real world also may respond to incentives that lead them to set their forecasts not to maximize accuracy and minimize RMSE, but to serve some other goal. These considerations, if expected to continue going forward, should be reflected in properly constructed prediction intervals, leading to the strong presumption that as little model structure should be imposed on them as possible, since no model can incorporate all these factors. Less structure favors prediction intervals constructed from the non-parametric distribution of errors the forecasters have actually made, which reflect asymmetries and other non-standard features. Distributions derived from a model or that impose symmetry or normality should be used only as a last resort.
Still, although the bar should be high for imposing unecessary structure that rules out past patterns continuing into the future, it is important to weigh carefully whether past patterns are likely to continue going forward. In the case at hand, the most pronounced 23 pattern in the distribution of Board staff forecast errors from 1999-2014 is its asymmetry, the fact that the Board staff forecast misses at one end of the distribution, when the forecasts were too low, were much larger than the misses at the other end of the distribution, when the forecasts were too high. Evaluation of the possible causes of this pattern is required to shed light on whether it is likely to persist.
At least three classes of potential explanations might account for the asymmetric pattern in the Board staff forecast errors. First, the "true" asymptotic distribution of forecast errors may be symmetric, with the asymmetry over the 16 years from 1999-2014 just due to chance.
The sample here is small, and the increase in energy and other commodity prices over this period was plausibly unanticipated and likely accounts for some of the asymmetry. However, it probably does not explain all of it. A sizable portion of that increase in energy and other commodity prices reversed by the middle of 2015, and adding a low 2015 inflation value to the sample does not change the asymmetry in the distribution of Board staff forecast errors very much. Furthermore, the Board staff forecast errors for "core" PCE price inflation-PCE price inflation excluding food and energy from the consumption bundle-retains some positive asymmetry from 1999-2014, even though Board staff unemployment rate forecast errors over this period show considerable positive skewness which should have led to negative skewness in the inflation forecast errors according to a Phillips curve relation.
19 And, as discussed further below, Board staff forecast errors have been more asymmetric than those from the private sector and from impartial models, with all the forecasts evaluated against the same set of shocks, including those from energy prices.
The second class of explanations for the asymmetry in the Board staff forecast errors are explanations that imply the "true" asymptotic distribution of forecast errors is asymmetric.
Such an asymmetry could arise for a number of reasons, including economic mechanisms like downward nominal wage rigidity feeding through to downward rigidities in consumer pricessee Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996) . If this class of explanations has some validity, then inflation forecasts set to minimize RMSE likely would produce a forecast error distribution that is asymmetric.
The third class of explanations is that the Board staff sets its forecasts in an idiosyncratic manner that generates some of the forecast error asymmetry. The simplest way to examine Of these three classes of explanations for the asymmetry in the Board staff inflation forecasts, only the first would justify imposing symmetry on the distribution of forecast errors in the low-variance, low-persistences state going forward. The evidence favorable to the other two hypotheses suggests that would be unwarranted.
Interval Construction
Based on the above considerations, this section computes prediction intervals substituting the non-parametic distribution derived from actual Tealbook forecast errors from 1999-2014
for the model-estimated distribution in the low-variance, low-persistence state. Using the appropriate probability weights, the overall cdf used to compute forecast error percentiles is a weighted average of (1) the discrete distribution of forecast errors from 1999-2014, linearly interpolating between observations, and (2) a normal cdf computed using model parameters in the high-variance, high-persistence state. These cdfs are computed using closed form solutions rather than simulations.
Since the model shows very high probabilities that inflation was in the low-variance, low-persistence state throughout 1999-2014, the discrete distribution is a non-parametric estimate of the forecast error distribution conditional on that state, g π t − π bs t |S t = 1 . Here π bs t are the actual Board staff forecasts, allowing asymmetries and any other features of those forecast errors to show through to the distribution and intervals. Of course, the cost to this approach is the lumpiness it introduces through use of a discrete distribution, mitigated somewhat by the interpolation between observations. Since no forecast observations are available from the high-variance, high-persistence state, those errors must be approximated using the parametric model:
While this is an approximation, the results from the last section suggest the variance of the error term and the random walk properties of the distribution are approximately correct, and those are the key features pinning down the forecast uncertainty beyond one period ahead.
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The probabilities from the parametric model are then used to combine the non-parametric g π t − π bs t |S t = 1 with the parametric g π t − π bs t |S t = 2 to produce the overall cdf and forecast error percentiles. The remaining panels of the table use alternative simulations to illustrate how the prediction intervals change with a hypothetical increase to 33 percent in the probability of the high-variance, high-persistence state. Several points are noteworthy. First, while the 15th, 50th, and 85th percentiles do move with this probability increase, the changes in these percentiles are not large. A high-variance, high-persistence probability close to 100 percent clearly would matter much more for even these middle percentiles, but it is the tail percentiles, the 5th and 95th, that respond most strongly to the probability increase examined here. And those tail percentiles are largely driven by the model itself, not the empirical 28 distribution of forecast errors: the 5th and 95th percentiles from the recommended hybrid version of the model in the top panels are quite close to those from the purely parametric model in the bottom panels. Second, the width of the 90 percent prediction interval defined by those tail percentiles now grows much more markedly with the forecast horizon, due to the random walk in the high-variance, high-persistence state. Finally, the second simulation changes the jumping off value for inflation from 1.1 percent, the estimate of 2014 PCE price inflation at the time of this writing, to 3.0 percent.
20 The jumping off value has a large effect on the tail percentiles, again due to the random walk in the high-variance, high-persistence state.
Conclusion
This paper constructs Markov-switching models that estimate the probability of inflation returning to a high-variance, high-persistence regime similar to the 1970s and 1980s, and uses those models to generate prediction intervals around Federal Reserve Board staff forecasts of PCE price inflation. Not surprisingly, the model probabilities show the low-variance regime with a stable mean has governed the behavior of inflation since the 1990s, and as long as the probability of the high-variance, high-persistence regime remains very low, the model's prediction intervals around one-and two-year ahead forecasts will be well-approximated by those computed from the distribution of forecast errors in the low-variance regime. The paper computes that distribution in the low-variance regime non-parametrically, and shows how to combine that non-parametric distribution with the parametric information from the Markovswitching model. If the model-based probability of the high-variance, high-persistence regime 20 For simplicity, estimated shock values are left unrevised.
were to increase substantially, the width of the prediction intervals, particularly those using the far tails of the mixture distribution, would widen substantially as well.
Additional results in the paper that may be innovations to some information sets include:
1. Over the full 1948-2014 sample, time series evidence strongly suggests the four-quarter inflation measures examined here follow MA(2) processes in differences. On average, about half of the typical innovation to the inflation process reverses after two years, with reversals following large innovations to oil and other commodity prices contributing importantly to this result.
2. Over the last 20 years of the sample, a wide range of evidence suggests there is no random walk component to inflation of any quantitative significance for forecasting purposes. Estimating the probability that a random walk reappears in the inflation process, is, of course, one of the main goals of the paper.
3. Survey measures of long-run inflation expectations, often used to make inferences about whether the current low-variance, low-persistence inflation regime is likely to continue, were unavailable in the late 1960s during the last transition out of such a regime, and were comparatively slow to recognize the transition into the current low-variance regime in the 1990s. The Markov-switching models were much faster in recognizing that regime transition in the 1990s, so they may provide more accurate and timely inferences on regime transitions going forward as well. cdf(k), or prob(π CP I < k) 1-cdf(k), or prob(π CP I > k) k = −1.5 k = −0.5 k = 0.5 k = 3.5 k = 4.5 k = 5. 
